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ABSTRACT 
The role innovation can play to make enterprises more dynamic and competitive is surely well known. For 
rural small and medium enterprises (SMEs) this can become a critical issue because they often need financial 
and technical incentives and support from public and private research institutions in order to make innovation 
accessible to them. Yet bridging research and productive dimensions is not always an easy task  The 
cooperation between researchers and rural entrepreneurs can become a rather demoralizing experience for 
both parties due to the action of a large number of inadequacies caused not only by financial, technical or 
organizational factors but also by cultural diversities and different approaches. This paper proposes some 
considerations matured by the authors while cooperating with some rural SMEs of agro-industrial and agro-
business sectors in Central Italy to implement actions of innovation and know how transfer. The experiences 
reported have been made within the framework of article 15 of the Ministerial Decree (Ministry of University 
and Research) n. 593/2000 which allows temporary deployment of personnel from research institutions in 
SMEs. In this paper the authors outline some methodological guidelines developed and adopted to analyze and 
meet the innovation demand from SMEs involved in innovation transfer processes. 
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DETAILED ABSTRACT 
This paper outlines some methodological guidelines developed and adopted to analyze and meet the 
innovation demand from SMEs involved in innovation transfer processes. The paper is divided into different 
analytical steps The first main step of this discussion involves an analysis about those factors and mechanisms 
capable to determine success or failure of the introduction of innovation itself. This step is composed of two 
sub-questions: a) nature and characteristics of innovation (what) and b) characteristics of innovation transfer 
(whether and how). With regards to the sub-question a) (nature and characteristics of innovation) innovations 
are classified according to their different nature and features: a description of an innovative cycle is also 
provided in this section. On the base of these elements, modes and times in which an innovative cycle is 
managed is described showing also those related extremely different results in the firm’s/farm’s approach to 
innovation according an analytical scheme. With regards to the sub-question b) (characteristics of innovation 
transfer) three complementary analytical levels are involved in this analysis  b.1) the characteristics of the 
innovation transfer source; b.2) the characteristics of the innovation transfer receiver and b.3) the relations 
between them. The combined action of these three problematic levels can produce a complex mix of 
negative/positive conditions really influencing the fate of the process of innovation transfer itself: a number of 
some frequent specific inefficiencies arising from empirical observation are described in this section. The 
second main step involves the description of the model adopted to manage a process of innovation transfer 
towards SMEs. This step is composed of two sub-questions: a) innovation and the enterprise’s “constitution” 
and b) innovation and the “culture of innovation”. In point a) (innovation and the enterprise’s “constitution”) 
the characteristics of the process adopted to draw a preliminary scheme of a firm’s/farm’s characteristics is 
provided together with the description of some analytical tools adopted to generate data and information. In 
point b) (innovation and the “culture of innovation”) three key-variables capable to influence and determine 
the culture of innovation are highlighted. Information about the firm’s constitution and innovation culture are 
then organized into two indicators: innovative potential and market position: the combination of these 
variables with those provided by the response to innovative cycles are implemented to identify four main 
categories showing different innovative potential and market position degree. On the base of the related 
results, two different general management approaches are outlined: these approaches should provide some 
useful contributions to concretely manage and cope with different attitudes towards innovation in order to 
grant to the processes of innovation transfer and cooperation between research centers and SMEs adequate 
potential and effective success margins. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) of 
agricultural, agro-industrial and agro-business sectors 
operating in rural areas look  at “innovation” with 
very differentiated attitudes: needs and pushes to 
adopt changes in a consolidated scenario (and the 
consequent reactions to adaptation processes) can 
highly vary in space and time. In these recent years, 
the direct and indirect effects of globalization 
represented for these rural sectors the main pushes to 
innovate caused by the reduction and progressive 
elimination of many geographical and legal 
traditional barriers [ 21,22] . Globalization forces (and 
the search of new relations in the trade of agricultural 
products between developing and developed 
countries) are fuelling in fact the current debate 
aiming at a re-thinking in many basic pillars of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European 
Union (EU) in particular with regards to the injection 
of more consistent openness to world market with a 
parallel reduction and elimination of market 
protection policies. This erosion in the direct and 
indirect protection for agriculture and for those rural 
productions with high “traditional” content is 
convincing more and more farms and rural firms to 
think in terms of efficiency and productivity, to 
search for new skills and know how to achieve 
competitiveness and exploit potential opportunities 
and benefits globalization can imply (for instance 
those related to the promotion and trade of specific 
products and services despite of isolation and 
distance from crucial market networks). [ 4,11,40]   
For the  rural sector as a whole, changes in 
characteristics, composition and, above all, 
connections between supply and demand are 
stimulating different reactions among the operators 
of the sector itself. Some entrepreneurs are exploiting 
the system’s potentials experimenting, for example, 
with new types of short market circuits (overcoming 
distributors and intermediate agents) thanks to the 
possibilities offered by Internet and the electronic 
commerce (The relations between Internet and rural 
enterprises are likely to be extremely complex under 
many points of view which cannot be  analyzed in 
detail here. It should be carefully evaluated if these 
investments can be justified and how consistent and 
coherent the related outcomes can be. E.commerce, 
e.business and Internet create often only illusions: in 
addition, who cannot afford further investments in 
this field to adequately promote his products and 
services remains “hidden” and isolated in this huge 
network.). Nonetheless these enterprises are facing a 
progressive massive challenge related to the effects 
of continuing market adjustments, concentration 
pushes, increasing competition among local, national 
and international suppliers in the same sector. 
Consolidated and inherited production and 
management methods, communication patterns and 
strategic synergies (defined to cope with 
concentration pushes and to provide solutions to a 
fragmented supply with no specific quality and 
image) tend to become obsolete in a very short time. 
Marginal areas can show even more severe problems 
for the reduction (negative flows) of resources they 
usually suffer. These regions are in weak and 
debilitated conditions to cope with the effects of 
concentration policies: their local savings are 
adsorbed by urban centers, young and professional 
skills are attracted by the opportunities offered in 
cities or abroad, local output is not processed at local 
level, etc. These flows deprive territories of 
resources and the involved enterprises show a 
reduced capability to generate and preserve added 
value at local level: therefore local capacities need 
improving substantially through an ad hoc resource 
and skills management (by public and private 
subjects) [ 14,43] . These conditions are at the base of 
an evolving scenario composed, at company level, by 
a number of rural firms and farms potentially 
interested in incremental improvement processes to 
their existing products/services. It implies radical 
innovations to which some enterprises seem unable 
to change their strategies despite recognising the 
need to modify their thinking. Scientific partnering, 
transferring “tangible” and “intangible” products of 
innovation (technologies, skills, experiences, 
methods, etc.) can become a key-factor for these 
components of rural enterpreneurship providing 
essential contributions to the recovery, consolidation 
and expansion  of economic activities [ 5,23,38,47] .  
The critical question of the entire issue is whether 
and how innovation, in terms of advanced equipment, 
practices, management tools, organizational 
structures and cultural changes, defined in research 
centers and experimented in testing firms, can be 
cloned and applied in a wider social and economic 
context. This question has to be considered as an 
essential component of “development” as a global 
issue  [ 2,12,48] ; often concrete obstacles for a 
widespread presence of a constructive environment 
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for an innovation convergence in these enterprises 
result from traditional approaches linked to ossified 
academic, folkloristic and bureaucratic visions. 
These approaches tend, in fact, to identify a limited 
diffusion of innovation with a lack of technologies, 
rather than a lack of an “innovation culture”, to be 
solved thanks to descending standardized policies. 
The complex network of internal and external 
relations at the base of the development of rural areas 
is evaluated with the same undifferentiated vertical 
and administrative procedures applied for decades in 
agriculture with a progressive extinction of initiative 
and personal commitment. All this does not 
contribute to increasing the interest in innovation 
investments, making these firms unable to see and 
retain an improvement in returns. This is the reason 
why innovations are paradoxically necessary to deal 
with innovation and make it convincing also 
considering the progressively  reduced availability in 
financial resources due to the European Union’s 
(EU) enlargement eastwards with the inclusion of 
even more disadvantaged territories. This makes a 
complete reliance on public subsidies to grant a 
firm’s (and farm’s) survival a not practicable option 
in the short run. On the contrary it is essential to 
undertake a better, correct and “transparent” use and 
management of the available resources, both at 
public and at private level, in order to make 
innovation (and development itself) efficient and 
effective through investments capable to produce, 
even with regards to innovation transfer, real and 
concrete benefits to firms, farms and the rural 
territories involved [ 49,52] . 
 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF INNOVATION 
The question whether and how innovation can be 
cloned and applied in a wider context is strictly 
connected to the understanding of those factors and 
mechanisms capable to determine success or failure 
of the introduction of innovation itself. It means that 
the above question has to be split into two sub-
questions: a) nature and characteristics of innovation 
(what) and b) characteristics of innovation transfer 
(whether and how). 
1) Innovation (what) is always linked to the idea of 
“change”: this question is critically connected to the 
fact that innovation doesn’t grow in a “ground zero” 
condition, but in a tissue formed by already existent 
resources, practices and approaches. Each concrete 
innovation process lies on former innovative 
processes: each innovation process thus creates the 
pre-conditions for the following one. In this way, the 
characteristics of the context in which an innovation, 
defined as a new combination of existing factors, 
occurs are so deeply modified to alter the entire 
process in forms totally different from those it would 
have shown if developed only thanks to its own 
conditions [ 46] . Innovations can show very different 
nature according to their features for example [ 18]  
“need spotting” innovations (providing answers for 
known problems), “solution spotting” innovations 
(finding a new way of using an existing piece of 
practices/techniques), “mental inventions” (dreamed 
up ideas with little reference to outside world) or 
“random events” (situations from which innovation 
arises from something they were not looking for). 
The empirical evidence provides several cases about 
these innovations and the simultaneous actions of 
different types of innovations capable to activate 
innovative cycles. For example, a cooperative 
specialized in organic farming faced concrete 
difficulties in finding in the market high quality 
certified seeds to be adequately adopted for the 
organic practices in the specific local context where 
this cooperative operates. For this reason, it has been 
decided, on the base of a pre-operating study, to 
invest firstly in research and training, thanks also to 
scientific partnerships with local research 
institutions, in order to identify those local vocational 
species and qualities of seeds capable to meet the 
farm’s needs and secondly in appropriate new 
equipment in order to concretely produce, select and 
package these seeds necessary for a certified organic 
farming. With the introduction of this need spotting 
innovation, this cooperative not only is presently 
capable to completely satisfy its own certified 
organic seeds’ demand, but it has quickly acquired a 
strong position in the market as supplier of high 
quality seeds for many other organic farms (thus 
concretely contributing to increase the farms 
profitability and to repaid the investments made). 
This machinery was also appropriately modified in 
order to better fulfil the farm’s needs and scale 
(solution spotting innovation). Also random events 
can provide interesting innovations. For example, the 
cooperative cited above adopts a modified machinery 
(solution spotting innovation) to carry on the harvest 
operations. Conventional harvester in fact select 
automatically wheat grains from infesting seeds 
releasing the latter immediately in field during the 
harvesting operations. The machinery has been 
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modified in order to avoid that infesting seeds, 
selected from wheat in a separated container, are 
released in field for eliminating the use of chemical 
herbicides. This sub-product was initially considered 
as a waste: then it has been found out that these 
infesting plants represent an excellent fodder for 
sheep. For this reason, these “wastes” have been 
adopted to seed grasslands now used for sheep 
pasturing for the production of meat in certified 
organic regime (innovation from a random event). 
Whether a new seed or a modified harvester, whether 
a new business niche or a new use of already existing 
resources, the core question is the variable value 
innovation provides to business and to farmers. At a 
first step, these innovations attracted in fact 
investments and showed a wide range of 
opportunities giving to this farm a leading position in 
the local market. At a second step, these innovations 
progressively lost their “experimental” character: 
they surely became more reliable and easy to use but 
also a routine event and more exposed to 
competitors’ imitation. This is confirm how these 
cyclical innovative processes are linked to complex 
systems composed of a large number of material and 
immaterial factors and elements which can be 
incorporated in two consequent lives as described in 
Figure 1 [ 41] . It is important to note that a process 
of change rarely involves an isolated innovation but 
rather groups of innovations (innovation clusters) 
and innovative actions operating on different 
intervention levels at the same time: for this reason 
these processes activate an innovative cycle 
characterized also by contagion and influences 
among firm sectors.  
The process described in Figure 1 can be thus 
referred to a standard innovative cycle which shows 
completely its “natural” phases. Of course, each 
innovative cycle, even if composed of one 
innovation, will show its own specific life with a 
variable expression and width of the phases 
described in this model. An innovative cycle is 
composed of a first period A (installation period) 
which starts with an activation moment and ends with 
an “explosion” moment. During this period A 
innovation irrupts into the firm in exploration, 
experimentation, planning and first exploitation 
phases with the first eventual economic benefits of 
innovation. During this phase innovation is “young”: 
it tends to be biased in small expert teams and shows 
its highest economic potential because, being 
concentrated in a limited groups of experts, it is 
characterized by complex processes and systems 
whose information bases are quickly and timely 
shared within these teams. To the  high economic 
potentials correspond a parallel high risk potential 
because innovation is still young: something “new” is 
always linked to uncertain factors which cannot be 
fully analyzed and evaluated and its introduction can 
generate unexpected results. The following period B  
(deployment period) starts with an adjustment phase 
and ends with a maturity phase. This period is 
characterized by synergies among firm sectors with 
increasing innovation maturity which progressively 
looses its innovative character. This period B is a 
routine and standardization phase during which 
processes have to be simplified in order to be 
generally shared: innovation shows a limited 
economic potential with a parallel decrease in risk 
and uncertainty. Between these two periods, a 
particularly critical phase can be highlighted: during 
a period C (turning point) operative choices are, in 
fact, adopted and decisions to move from A to B.  
Modes and times in which these two lives 
are managed, create extremely different results in the 
firm’s  approach to innovation according to the 
following scheme:  
i.  firms which do not enter period A activating 
only period B: this is an approach essentially based 
on imitation copying from others’ experience and 
from innovative firms. This case implies fewer risks: 
profits can be generated mainly by the absence of 
R&D costs but these firms enter the market late, 
through paths  already explored and exploited by 
others. A typical example is provided by a small farm 
machinery producer in a rural area who imitates and 
adapts the multinational’s models to local conditions. 
ii.  Firms which enter period A with extremely 
short B and C periods. These pioneer firms are 
highly based on innovation which can potentially 
generate great economic benefits, but they have to 
deal with high risk. These firms must be extremely 
flexible because adjustment time is extremely short. 
There are many examples of this approach among 
rural firms involved in the sector of functional 
packaging of fresh products at farm level or firms 
specialized in IT services for rural enterprises and 
farms. 
Firms which enter A and B periods are usually 
dynamic enterprises whose dynamic attitude is 
however linked to the time length of the involved 
periods. Typical examples of these enterprises are the 
multi-use farms systematically dedicated to multi-
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faced and multiple agricultural activities (organic 
farming, crop production, animal husbandry for meat 
and diary, aquaculture, environmental initiatives, 
educational schemes, research partnerships, etc.). 
 
Figure 1: Innovative cycle 
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INNOVATION
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irruption
launch
starting point explosion
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A particular attention should be paid to period C. 
The acquisition of potential economic benefits from 
innovation in period B depends not only on the 
length of this period but also on the time length and 
characteristics of period C. If decisions and operative 
choices are made in a too long time, the above 
mentioned potential of period B will progressively 
decrease. On the contrary a too short period C could 
activate adaptation problems: in this case the impact 
of innovation on human resources could drive to 
potential fierce oppositions to innovation, sabotage 
and luddism. This period C is thus strictly related to 
the firm’s flexibility degree of human resources. This 
flexibility has to be carefully evaluated in order to 
grant adequate success margins to the innovative 
process adopted. Innovation in fact does not enter a 
static reality but rather a living context. A firm could 
have experienced a former innovative cycle (with its 
own characteristics) being ready to begin a new one 
or, on the contrary, adopt an opposite choice without 
entering an innovative cycle for a large number of 
reasons: a conservative attitude and doubts toward 
that type of innovation, the presence of subsidies, 
risks and costs considered too high, the firm 
operating in a distorted economic scenario - due to 
political corruption and bribes [ 45]  – pushing 
entrepreneurs to consider the introduction of 
innovations useless, etc. With regards to this, 
Schumpeter argues that “(the economic problem of 
production) should be distinguished from a purely 
technical problem. Between these two aspects there 
is an antithesis which in the economic life can be 
frequently found in the personal contrasts in a firm 
between technical and commercial managers. With 
regards to this, it could be noted that changes in 
production processes are often suggested by one side 
and rejected by the other side; for example an 
engineer suggesting a new process  rejected by the 
commercial director because being  considered not 
profitable”. Schumpeter argues also that both 
technical and economic aspects of  production are 
based on a concept of “utility”: this conflict is 
generated by different natures and meanings of this 
“utility”. “… technology is directed to elaborate 
production methods for requested goods. Economic 
reality does not push these methods to their logical 
conclusion and in a technologically perfect way, but 
it submits their realization to an economic point of 
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view. The ideal technical framework, which does not 
take into consideration economic relations, is thus 
modified  .  Economic logic prevails on the 
technological one. For this reason it is possible to see 
in the everyday life, worn ropes rather than steel 
cables, poor rather than excellent animals, the most 
primitive hand work rather than perfect machines, a 
coarse economy based on coins rather than cheques 
and so on. Best economically and technically perfect 
combinations are thus not necessary and often 
distinct and not simply due to ignorance or indolence 
but because technologically inferior methods can be 
better adapted to given conditions ”. (J. A. 
Schumpeter 1946 translated from the italian version). 
As mentioned above, innovations operate at 
different levels being not only synonym of new 
technologies. At the company level, it has to  be 
noticed that eventual changes could involve a wider 
spectrum of intervention areas as follows: 
  a technological level (innovations in processes 
and products) 
  an economic level (new methods to reduce costs, 
wastes, defects and to increase profits) 
  a financial level (new methods and opportunities 
to access to credit, to obtain subsidies, public, EU 
and private contributions, opportunities to make 
investments in financial markets, etc.) 
  a management level (rationalization and 
optimization of decision making, evaluation of 
alternatives and choices, improvements in human 
resources management and evaluation, etc.) 
Each intervention level shows its own peculiar 
characteristics with different priority degree highly 
varying in time and from firm to firm. Despite this 
high variability, it is possible to note that basic 
problematic issues and conditions are essentially the 
same. For all these levels the basic question is again 
how to inject new skills, within a realistic framework, 
related to workers’ and managers’ mentalities and 
behaviors operating in a “consolidated” environment.  
2)  Innovation transfer (whether and how) shows 
three complementary analytical levels based on a) the 
characteristics of the innovation transfer source; b) 
the characteristics of the innovation transfer receiver 
and c) the relations between them. The combined 
action of these three problematic levels can produce 
a complex mix of negative/positive conditions really 
influencing the fate of the process of innovation 
transfer itself.  
With regards to point a) it should be noted that the 
possibilities to create a  scientific partnering are 
essentially connected to a problem-solving approach 
eventually available within research institutions and 
centers involved. It implies a crucial paradigm shift 
involving a concrete softening in scientists’ and 
researchers’ attitudes about “getting their hands 
dirty”, spending their time and spreading their own 
intellectual properties into the market-place. This 
paradigm shift needs to be supported not only by 
investments and funds (from private and public 
sources) but also by appropriate human resources 
with specific skills to adequately undertake and 
manage innovation transfer processes [ 15,32,35,51] . 
Point b) is essentially related to the question about 
“interest for innovation” which is at the base of an 
innovation demand. This factor can highly vary in 
different forms and intensity from firm to firm and 
within the same firm. To these different interests and 
forms correspond (and are translated into) 
differentiated innovation needs [ 8,9,20,44] . In 
general terms, rural SMEs, for their small scale 
structure, have no  personnel or teams specifically 
devoted to Research and Development (R&D): 
interest for innovation is usually  limited to one or 
more individuals who can be named “pioneers”. 
These individuals in general, but not necessarily, are 
the firm’s (or farm’s) owners or however cover 
directive position through which they can stimulate 
the introduction of innovation. These pioneers not 
always face an easy task: not rarely (mainly if they 
are not the firm’s owners) they have to cope with a 
feeling of opposition and resistance even toward 
simple imitation processes and are pushed to 
marginal positions. Yet without these figures it is not 
possible to undertake an innovative process or 
activate channels  of transfer from the sources of 
innovation generation. The failure and success of an 
innovation transfer process thus depends on the 
identification of these pioneers and on a deeper and 
correct quantification and evaluation of innovative 
demands and needs. 
With regards to point c) it could be argued that 
the relations between  innovation source and 
innovation receiver can be influenced by a 
problematic mix related to one o more 
inadequacies which can determine and ossify 
concrete gaps  [[[[ 3,19,24,26,28,29,42]]]] . These 
inadequacies can be summarised as follows:  
a) inadequacies deriving from the nature of 
institutions generating innovation: they can 
include: 
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  inadequacies in terms of distance – this means a 
physical distance between institutions and rural 
firms. Added to physical distance is the 
psychological distance arising form the fact that 
researchers, administrators and bureaucrats often 
know very  little about the  rural socio-economic 
environment. Many aspects of this context are not 
immediately evident and considered low profile 
issues: administrators and researchers tend to be not 
interested in them.  
  inadequacies in terms of time  – research 
institutions and agencies have their own “time”; in 
many cases research activities and procedures last 
several years, whereas needs for entrepreneurs can be 
generally short-term.  
  inadequacies in interests and in  defining the 
intervention objective – For many researchers, 
objectives and results may be divorced from a 
global vision of the area in which these firms 
operate: frequently the objective is too 
circumscribed, limited and partial, rather than a 
part of a territorial strategy; 
  inadequacies in terms of approach – A 
researcher and an entrepreneur  often show a 
completely different approach when coping with 
problems and implications related to innovation; 
  inadequacies in terms of communication: 
research institutions and agencies tend to use two 
different languages. The former language is mainly 
based on juridical and legal terms while the latter is 
tailored for specific intervention areas (agriculture, 
health, environment, scientific research, etc.). The 
result of this coexistence of languages is frequently 
translated into very complex documents which create 
severe communication problems between institutions 
and individuals and among institutions. This 
condition can also be the consequence of an unclear 
language frequently adopted in State law and 
regulations to which research institutions have to 
refer. These documents are rarely written paying 
attention to the final users, being created to be mainly 
coherent to bureaucratic languages.  
b) Inadequacies in terms of practices; the lack of 
adequate knowledge on rural context results in 
actions that sometimes conflict with farms’ and rural 
firms’ needs. 
c) Inadequacies associated with financial 
problems: in general, very few financial resources 
are earmarked actions directed to aid rural 
development as operative context for these 
farms/firms. Many intervention measures that may be 
useful to support an innovation culture in rural areas 
are often the product of actions directed for other 
purposes for example sector actions, especially in 
agriculture, energy, environment, etc.  
The complexity of the multi-sector and multi-
level system resulting from the action of these factors 
pushes toward the definition of a specific operational 
method and model capable to deal with the above 
mentioned issues and provide adequate “problem 
solving” approaches to the following basic questions:  
  How to  evaluate a firm’s/farm’s attitude and 
capability to acquire competitiveness due to 
innovation injection? 
  How to evaluate a firm’s/farm’s predisposition to 
achieve this task? 
  How to evaluate the eventual gaps between this 
predisposition and an estimated degree of 
competitiveness degree to grant, in a mid term, 
growth and development of a firm/farm? 
 
Possible answers to these questions are thus 
connected to the possibility: a) to identify a pioneer 
(or a group of pioneers) within the firm; b) to outline 
a firm’s configuration in order to provide an 
identification, quantification and classification of 
innovation needs, according to a priority order 
(innovation demand); c) to identify potential 
innovation intervention levels; d) to define strategies 
and methods to undertake these innovations and the 
related innovation transfer process; e) to remove 
eventual obstacles and solve difficulties in the 
exchange process. 
 
THE OPERATIONAL MODEL ADOPTED: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
An evaluation of innovation demand from a firm 
interested in processes of transfer firstly has to be 
based on the identification and quantification of 
endogenous and exogenous factors (within both 
transfer partners) capable of influencing and 
determining the above described inadequacies. The 
following macro problem areas encompass and 
summarize the main operational topics interested in 
these processes of innovation transfer.  
 
Innovation and the enterprise’s “constitution” 
The identification of innovation needs should be 
firstly based on a preliminary analytical process 
directed to the description of the framework in which 
the innovation transfer had to be implemented 
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[ 6,25,36,53] . This preliminary process (Figure 2) is 
essentially focused on the evaluation of a) existing 
elements; b) practices; c) organizational systems 
based on these practices and d) reference values in 
order to create a first set of data and information 
about: 1) production/processing volume; 2) existence 
of technical problems and their usual solutions; 3) 
trade strategies and prices adopted; 4) expectations; 
5) priorities; 6) level of staff commitment. 
The correct problem formulation and the 
organization of both numerical data and verbal 
considerations useful for the generation of 
knowledge indicators (and the management of the 
entire process) have been achieved adopting the 
following analytical tools [ 39] : 
  KJ diagrams (Figure 3/a) 
  Relation diagrams (Figure 3/b) 
  “tree” diagrams (Figure 3/c) 
  PERT (Program Evaluation and Review 
Technique) diagrams (Figure 3/d) 
 
Knowledge indicators can describe the static 
situation providing traces and snapshots on specific 
aspects of the firm’s life. These indicators are thus 
unable to outline the framework of possible transfer 
actions because they cannot highlight causes and 
issues linked to innovations and their transfer; they 
cannot provide operational indications for the 
solution of problematic conditions either. The 
evaluation of possible causes and eventual solutions 
can be achieved in the following planning phase 
highlighting, in the same time, some crucial elements 
which can influence (positively or negatively) 
cooperation and know how transfer between 
operators and researchers such as: common 
potentials and problems, better definition of the 
enterprise’s identity, identification of ignored 
resources, identification of critical contact points, 
etc. 
This phase, with the inclusion of the action of causes 
and effects, can lead to the definition of the dynamic 
situation in production with particular regards to 
volumes, real quality levels, motivations, 
expectations and mentality of workers and managers 
thus contributing to outlining a “provisional” 
intervention strategy. Even if dynamic, the scenario 
(which has to be checked and re-tested) defined so 
far does not clarify the firms’ innovation needs yet 
because many crucial elements for the definition of 
the firm attitude toward innovations have not been 
identified. At this stage it is possible to identify the 
transfer receiver profile through the reaction of the 
enterprise’s “constitution” identifying eventual 
critical points where innovation can concretely act. 
An enterprise’s “constitution” is generally defined 
through the following elements [ 1,30,31] :  
  firm’s values and priorities 
  characteristics of firm culture 
  the prevailing mentalities  
  the characteristics of the main decisional and 
management processes 
  techniques and methods used by the staff 
  the “climate” or perceptions and feelings of the 
staff about relations, organizational mechanisms and 
staff management 
 
The definition of this constitution, highlighting 
attitudes and the context of possible reactions toward 
innovation, can provide essential contributions to 
understanding  if innovation is (or is not) seen as a 
tool mainly influencing individuals’ mentality rather 
than norms or equipment which have to be 
implemented only to reduce costs and defects, 
increase profits and productivity or improve staff 
motivation.  
 
Innovation and the “culture of innovation” 
The introduction of innovations does not increase 
sales and profits per sé: innovation can act as a key-
factor, thus determining benefits and successes for a 
firm, only if supported by a flexible mentality, 
continuing improvements, creativity and spirit of 
initiative  [ 27,37] . This statement should be 
considered as the basic principle of the “culture of 
innovation” and if this notion is insufficiently shared 
within a firm, any attempt to adopt advanced 
technologies, new management or production 
methods could be a very expansive (in economic and 
non-economic terms) and often ineffective option 
because fundamentally extemporaneous.  
Within this scenario, the complex relations between 
innovation and the culture of innovation available in 
a firm/farm play a fundamental role. Three key-
variables can be placed at the base of a culture of 
innovation:  
  Time of adjustment. Every change creates 
problems: the culture of innovation is linked to a 
reactivity degree and the adjustment capabilities in 
coping with (and solve) those problems unavoidably 
related to the process of innovation introduction. In 
general, advantages and benefits from the 
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implementation of innovations tend to decrease when 
adjustment time increases. If a firm shows an 
adequate culture of innovation, the adjustment time 
will be generally short thus receiving higher benefits 
and gains from the process of change. On the 
contrary,  if a firm shows scarce reactivity with too 
long time in coping and solving these problems, 
potential advantages will be reduced and the bases 
and the credibility of the innovative process itself 
will be eroded. 
  Sensibility to problems. The culture of innovation 
highly depends on how a firm reacts and deals with 
problems. It can show high sensibility to problems 
when they are considered as operative impulses or 
incentives with high sense of responsibility: these 
problems are identified and analyzed during the 
planning phases with the adoption of a preventive 
approach. On the contrary, hiding, ignoring, 
underestimating problems or throwing responsibility 
and faults on each other denounce a low sensibility: 
problems are usually faced in extremis with 
emergency remedies. 
  Involvement. The culture of innovation depends 
on how managers and workers are involved within 
the innovative process. The more human resources 
involved, the higher the effectiveness of innovative 
actions. In particular for SMEs this condition has to 
be achieved also overcoming those invisible borders 
among the sectors of the firm. Workers in all firm 
sectors have to be informed and involved even if the 
innovative actions do not (apparently) concern them 
directly in order to stimulate however an interest and 
a reaction attitude toward innovation and contribute 
to the creation of a “mentality of innovation” in the 
whole firm. 
 
Figure 2: Steps in the operative process 
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Figure 3a: A KJ diagram 
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Figure 3b: A relation diagram 
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Figure 3c: A “tree” diagram 
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Figure 3d: A PERT diagram 
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Information about the  firm’s constitution and 
innovation culture can be organized into two 
indicators: innovative potential and market position 
(Figure 4). Innovative potential can be described by 
the critical elements of the culture of innovation 
(time of adjustment, sensibility to problems, 
involvement), technologies, techniques and practices 
adopted, etc. Strength and weakness of a firm’s 
market position can be related to some parameters 
such as product or service prices, product or service 
quality and its substitution degree, the firm’s 
position, promotion, public relations, power. 
Combining these variables with those provided by 
the response to innovative cycles it is possible to 
identify four main categories showing different 
innovative potential and market position degree:  
  Area 1 Firms with high innovative potential and 
strong market position. This is a situation of 
excellence. These firms can be potentially very 
interested in innovation transfer for example to 
achieve a diversification in their output, to constantly 
improve management efficiency or to boost 
productivity. 
  Area 2 Firms with a strong market position but 
weak innovative potential. These firms often show 
mistrust toward innovation with too long time 
adjustment, scarce involvement of human resources, 
scarce sensibility to problems loosing the benefits 
from innovation adoption. This condition can result 
from several causes. As mentioned above, a firm’s 
strength depends on economic (prices, quality, 
substitution degree, position, promotion) and extra-
economic factors (public relations, power). Some 
considerations about the relations between technical 
and economic forces within a firm have been already 
made (see note 2). These firms are likely to face , 
however , an erosion in their competitive degree in 
the medium run pushing them from area 2 to area 3. 
It implies difficult transfer processes but the 
overcoming of these difficulties depends mainly: a) 
on the pioneers’ capability to interrupt the vicious 
circles based on conservative attitudes and b) on the 
capabilities of transfer managers to adopt innovation 
transfer processes capable of generating short term 
problem solving results. If so, there are potential 
opportunities for these firms to move from area 2 to 
area 1. If extra-economic factors prevail over the 
economic ones in determining the firm’s strength, the 
mistrust toward innovation finds completely different 
causes and motivations. In this case, these firms 
operate in a distorted scenario when for example 
political connections prevail over product  quality: 
these connections could provide also a privileged 
access to subsidies and other public support. In these 
conditions (from know how to know who), any 
innovation transfer process will face obstacles and 
oppositions: improvements in adjustment time, in 
sensibility to problems or in staff involvement will 
not be seen as priority tasks by the management and 
the firm’s leadership because this firm is 
“competing” on the base of completely different 
parameters (to which innovation transfer can have 
very little effect). 
  Area 3 Firms with a weak innovative potential 
and weak market position. In this case, innovation 
(and innovation transfer) will find obstacles because 
considered only as “costs”. The reason for this 
condition could lie on the considerations made 
above. The conservative firm is based on the owner’ 
long experience, sometimes also inherited, who 
instinctively knows what to do to obtain his/her usual 
gains. He/she respects, as better as he/she can, this 
experience and tends to adopt very gradual changes 
only on the bases of the circumstances. Innovation is 
thus identified with an unknown risk: in these firms 
there are few (and often marginal) pioneers. In this 
case, the opportunity to inject innovation are linked 
to the adoption of extremely gradual processes: small 
steps with prudent (but highly convincing) actions 
involving cheap investments.  
  Area 4 Firms with high innovative potential and 
weak market position. These firms are in general 
very interested in innovation and innovation transfer 
because they tend to strengthen their market position. 
As already mentioned, if this weakness depends on 
extra-economic factors, the innovative potential is 
frustrated by distortions in the operative environment 
in which privileged contacts prevail on market 
efficiency; in this case, these firms could shift to area 
3 because leadership and pioneers see their efforts to 
inject innovation constantly frustrated. 
In general, these categories can encompass firms 
potentially interested in innovation transfer. Yet 
types of innovations and transfer methods can greatly 
vary from area to area. Also considering eventual 
distortions in the operative environment, it should be 
possible to make some general conclusions as 
follows (Figure 5): 
 
 CANNARELLA C., PICCIONI, V. 
Journal of Central European Agriculture (online), Volume 4 (2003) No 4  384
Figure 4: Innovation potential and market strength 
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Figure 5: Leni and Pleno Gradu approaches 
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  in case of high innovative potential, a pleno 
gradu approach (from Latin “with great steps”) could 
be adopted. This approach is based on great 
innovative breakthroughs involving great amount of 
investments and high risk. In this case, very 
specialized transfer actions, high skilled human 
resources and advanced financial schemes are 
requested  This kind of approach is usually leaded by 
small teams of specialists and does not need high 
strategic commitment because transfer processes find 
a positive ground due to the presence of an elevate 
innovative potential. A pleno gradu approach is 
mainly linked to technological transfer with a very 
fast adoption of new methods, practices, equipment, INNOVATION TRANSFER AND RURAL SMES 
Journal of Central European Agriculture (online), Volume 4 (2003) No 4  385
processes with a parallel destruction of the former 
operative context. Being a rather shocking approach 
it requires very flexible and skilled human capital: 
with regards to Figure 1, this approach is likely to 
create innovative cycles based on high curves and 
narrow time periods; 
  in case of weak innovative potential a leni gradu 
approach (from Latin “with small steps”) could 
provide useful contributions to introduce innovation 
through gradual steps and a wider staff involvement. 
This approach is mainly directed to small 
improvements in the use of existing resources and 
conventional know how. This strategy requires less 
investments compared to the pleno gradu approach 
but results, even if relevant, will be less 
“revolutionary” and shocking because this strategy is 
mainly directed to human resources and mentalities 
in order to stimulate the development of an 
innovative potential thanks to a long path of small 
steps, sometimes even apparently inconsistent, within 
all the firm’s levels. For this reason, commitment has 
to be particularly high because of a generally non 
positive environment for transfer: a widespread 
mistrust has to be faced with few carefully selected 
actions capable of granting adequate success 
margins. With regard to Figure 1, this approach will 
involve innovative cycles based on generally flat 
curves and rather long time periods. 
 
The main differences between these approaches are resumed in the following table: 
  Leni Gradu  Pleno Gradu 
Investments,  required degree  Low High 
Efforts, required  degree  High Low 
Human resources involvement  High Low 
Priorities  Commitment and efforts  Results and profits 
Focus  Culture and mentality  Technology 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The critical role of innovation and its implication and 
effects to increase a firm’s competitiveness are well 
known  [ 10,13,16,33,50] . Rural entrepreneurs not 
always tend to see at innovation as an investment but 
rather an issue in immediate relation to a gains/losses 
balance and to a modification of the context in which 
they usually operate. Innovation can therefore 
become a reply to changed conditions and thus an 
instrument of that change itself: it implies a timely 
adaptation process even if a complex system of 
inadequacies can deeply influence transfer’s types 
and modalities. The adaptation processes generated 
by innovation and by innovation transfer can create a 
number of difficulties: even in the case of simple and 
inexpensive innovations (ad example simple 
protocols useful to obtain and organize information 
about the implications and consequences of a 
modified operative context) an innovation transfer 
could face severe obstacles, difficulties and a lack of 
a timely reaction. 
In case of firms showing low innovative potential, a 
transfer process capable of producing effective 
results in the short run (involving “need spotting” 
and “solution spotting” innovations) has to be 
preferred; this process shouldn’t be restricted to 
limited intervention areas but it should have global 
implication stimulating imitative actions and the 
diffusion of innovation clusters. These conditions are 
essential for the stimulation of an innovation culture 
in all firm sectors. Even if a firm showing similar 
characteristics intends to undertake big innovative 
breakthroughs (for example just to imitate a 
competitor), supporting this choice could be a very 
destructive suggestion. This option will provoke 
easily predictable big financial costs: but the worst 
side effects of the failure of an innovative process are 
not immediately evident and quantifiable. It is 
extremely difficult in fact to quantify (and repair) the 
consequences, not only on a firm’s/farm’s fate but 
also on the people involved and the territory where 
they operate, of mistrust and frustration toward 
innovation for the erosion and weakening in 
credibility of the eventually existing culture of 
innovation and initiative. It is the case, for example, 
of the adoption of an ISO9002 regulation scheme in 
a winery, actually producing excellent wines, but not 
“culturally” ready for this type of actions: soon this 
scheme has been seen by the staff as an expansive 
and useless loop which creates only impediments and 
time losses thus severely contributing to this 
initiative’s failure. Now in this context innovative 
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Journal of Central European Agriculture (online), Volume 4 (2003) No 4  386
episodic random events not systematically adopted 
for the significant mistrust and rigidities in 
management and in personnel.  
This is to confirm that the adoption and 
implementation of specific innovations require sound 
cultural bases in order to make them real and realistic 
strategic factors for competitiveness and growth. The 
elements at the base of this culture represent 
therefore the framework to which innovative 
technologies, methods, practices, etc. can effectively 
refer thus positively reverting some typical 
stereotypes toward innovation such as:  
  Innovation is not a priority. The real priorities for 
a firm are costs and deliveries. 
  The  firm’s strategy is mainly focused on 
competitors rather than on clients. 
  High incidence of a static attitude (i. e. resistance 
to any change) in firm’s costs. 
  Innovation is synonym only of “new 
technologies”: it is a problem involving only 
productive processes thus excluding any other sector. 
 
The effects of these stereotypes on a rural firm’s 
strategy are usually translated in the idea that 
innovation is a “financial” cost. Yet a deeper analysis 
can highlight that types and sizes of the obstacles 
impeding the diffusion of innovation within a firm 
can be of very different nature. Scarce financial 
resources or difficulties in the access to credit can 
severely hit any effort toward innovation. So far, so 
obvious. Yet a lack of a culture of innovation (in 
private as well as in public subjects) can hamper any 
development and recovery process even when ad hoc 
investments (at local, national and international 
level) are potentially available for agricultural and 
rural enterprises making this investment deployment 
definitively ineffective and determining an over-
invested but still outdated productive tissue [ 34] . 
Those obstacles to innovation, being a multilevel 
process of change, related to principles and visions 
rooted in both rural entrepreneurs’ and in R&D 
organizations’, agencies’ and institutions’ 
mentalities, cannot be therefore ignored or under 
estimated  [ 7,17] . A deep analysis on material/non 
material resources and on human capital, together 
with the identification of actual and potential forces 
capable of positively affecting the productive and the 
social tissues, is a critical pre-condition in order to 
make investments for innovation effective and 
efficient. In this scenario, innovation can concretely 
act as a turning point for a static and repetitive status 
generating profits, a better resource allocation, a 
diffusion of initiative attitudes, etc. A trend toward a 
static condition has to be considered as a potential 
source of opposition to a change process. According 
to an economic, technological, management and 
psychological point of view, routine always 
represents an easier path when compared to unknown 
consequences of innovation. Aggressive actions to a) 
break down static trends biasing resources in 
investments for innovation and b) stimulate induction 
and imitation (innovation clusters) could concretely 
contribute to generate impulses of investment waves 
which will tend to exhaust at the beginning of a next 
concentration of innovation clusters.  
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